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The Utility of a Bright-line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic Controversy
and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros.1
by John B. Fowles*
Lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittit[?]2
I. INTRODUCTION: WISDOM AND OBJECTIVITY IN COPYRIGHT ADJUDICATION
Judges must be wise; they should consider the wide field of human experience available
through their own particular circumstances when adjudicating. Luckily, then, in this “postmodernist, post-structuralist” period, a judge may “resourcefully and opportunistically borrow
whatever tools might be available to solve particular problems at hand.”3 But does this also mean
that judges should necessarily “be conscious of aesthetics when deciding copyright cases,”4 as
intuitive as such a proposition might seem? Truly, copyright cases turn on the originality of
expression in an ostensible work of art. But reliance on aesthetic understanding—or lack of it—
in deciding some copyright cases could also lead judges to sink deeper into a “quagmire of
conceptual separability”5 in their efforts to protect pictorial, graphic, or structural works of art
(PGS works) that have been incorporated into works of architecture. The court in Leicester v.
Warner Bros. correctly recognized Congress’s intention in the Architectural Works Copyright
* Associate, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.; B.A., Brigham Young University; M.St., University of Oxford; J.D.,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University
1
232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
2
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217 (quoting Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) on equity) (“The law
does not define exactly, but leaves something to the discretion of a just and wise judge.” Translation of
http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/blackstone/cle.int.s02.html. Last visited March 22, 2004.).
3
Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1604
(1991); see also Wendell L. Griffen, The Role and Influence of Religious Value in Judicial Decisionmaking: A
Normative Perspective, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513, 518 (1997) (“Judges must be open-minded to all sources of truth if
we are to be competent deliberators of the value-laden issues brought for our decision. We are free to hear the voices
of religious values, mathematical principles, classical literature, popular music, and quotations by Sherlock Holmes
in our effort to understand the issues we must consider. This is another way of saying that judges are free to hear the
voices of William Shakespeare, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, John Locke, Robert Browning, Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Moses, Jesus, Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass, and Martin Luther King, Jr.,
without embarrassment or hesitation as we deliberate.”).
4
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998) (suggesting that
judges need “an overall understanding of art to make intelligent decisions” about copyright cases before them).
5
Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., concurring).
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Protection Act of 19906 (AWCPA) to avoid this morass of conceptual separability and its
intrinsic aesthetic controversy—which arise from the lack of architectural substance in the
Copyright Act of 1976—by enforcing a bright-line rule that spares judges from entering this
common-law quagmire in the first place.
The undeniable reality that “copyright law simply requires aesthetic choices”7 speaks
against an objective approach to copyright adjudication. Personal bias colors the individual’s
perception of every situation. In fact, precisely the same post-modernist, post-structuralist
environment that generally allows a bricoleur8 judge in the courtroom also necessarily prevents
objectivity in today’s permanently fragmentized society.9 Part II of this Article emphasizes the
aesthetic difficulties inherent in a copyright jurisprudence that claims objectivity, discussing in
detail the esoteric nature of the conceptual separability test(s) for divorcing a PGS work from the
useful article—such as a work of architecture—of which it may be a part. Part III highlights
Congress’s hope to replace this conceptual separability “conundrum”10 with a bright line rule in
conjunction with the copyright protection extended to architectural works under the 1990 law.
Part IV relates this statutory history to the facts of Leicester and applauds the Leicester court’s
careful and accurate construction of the AWCPA. Proceeding in this way, the Ninth Circuit
adhered strictly to the legislative intent of eliminating conceptual separability from architectural

6

Pub. L. No. 101-650, 701, 703 (codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 102(a)(8), 120) (2004).
Yen, supra note 4, at 251.
8
Levinson & Balkin, supra note 3, at 1604-05 (discussing Claude Levi-Strauss’s views on interpretation).
9
STEPHEN BUNGAY, BEAUTY AND TRUTH. A STUDY OF HEGEL’S AESTHETICS 163 (1984) (“As modern
society is complex and heterogeneous, it is not clear on what ethical principles it is based, or even if it is based on
any at all that are accepted by all its citizens, rather than just a particular group.”). Hegel makes this ethical concern
central to his assessment of aesthetics: the epic hero in literature is no longer possible, as exemplified by Goethe’s
medieval knight Götz von Berlichingen or Cervantes’s Don Quixote, who personify a past order no longer
compatible with—and frankly laughable compared to—“modern” society. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I,
in 13 WERKE 256-57.
10
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20–21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950–51 (1990) (explaining
that a “principal reason” for the AWCPA amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976 adding architecture as a new
category of protected subject matter was to free the courts from the “separability conundrum presented by the useful
articles doctrine”).
7

2
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copyright. The development of a bright-line rule in this copyright context is not without its
advantages and disadvantages for architects and artists, as duly noted in Part IV. But Part V
concludes that despite imperfections in the statute, the Leicester court’s strict construction of the
AWCPA’s bright-line rule has saved judges from aesthetic controversy and conceptual
separability in cases regarding the copyright of PGS works attached to architectural works.
II. AESTHETIC VS. USEFUL ARTICLES—OR USEFUL AESTHETIC ARTICLES?
A. Embarking on Aesthetic Objectivity
Although learned jurists, most common-law judges do not have a Ph.D. in aesthetics,
philosophy, or literature. And yet, “the aesthetic nature of copyright reasoning would have to be
characterized as profound because it constitutes a version of the most sophisticated aesthetic
debates our culture knows.”11 The conflation of these two premises leads to a prescriptive
conclusion: judges should not rely on their own aesthetic tastes or understanding in copyright
adjudication; or formulated positively, aesthetics should be immaterial in copyright
jurisprudence.
Admittedly, judges in early copyright cases took for granted that they had to make
aesthetic choices in enforcing copyright protection. For example, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony,12 the Supreme Court found that a photograph of Oscar Wilde fulfilled the
originality requirement of copyright protection13 because it was “useful, new, harmonious,

11

Yen, supra note 4, at 252. Professor Yen’s frank and skillful assessment of the role of aesthetics’
inevitability in copyright adjudication in his seminal article on Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory informs
this investigation of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Leicester v. Warner Bros. and the AWCPA’s bright-line rule
generally.
12
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
13
Id. at 59 (holding that the author must prove “the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual
production, of thought, and conception on the part of the author” when suing for violation of copyright). Congress
reiterated the dispositive role of originality in copyright in the 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act: “The two
fundamental criteria of copyright protection—originality and fixation in tangible form—are restated in the first
sentence of this cornerstone provision [17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976)].” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.

3
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characteristic, and graceful.”14 Essentially, the Burrow-Giles Court performed an aesthetic
valuation to determine copyrightability. Perhaps the possibility of a Burkean15 or Kantian16
regime of objective aesthetics—as opposed to the current insistence on aesthetic objectivity17—
still persisted in copyright jurisprudence at the end of the nineteenth century. But by the
beginning of the twentieth century, courts distanced themselves from the appearance of aesthetic
subjectivity in their copyright adjudications, as reasoned by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographic Co.18 Finding circus advertisements copyrightable even though they
had not been traditionally identified with the fine arts—or in other words, they had not been
officially viewed as aesthetically beautiful—Justice Holmes enshrined a mandate of aesthetic
objectivity for judges in copyright cases: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
14

Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59.
EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND
BEAUTIFUL (James T. Boulton ed., University of Notre Dame Press 1968) (1757) (arguing for the existence of an
objective aesthetic ideal that affects the mind from without). In his Enquiry Burke theorizes,
Beauty is a thing much too affecting not to depend upon some positive qualities. And, since it is
no creation of our reason, since it strikes us without any reference to use, and even where no use at
all can be discerned, since the order and method of nature is generally very different from our
measures and proportions, we must conclude that beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in
bodies, acting mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses.
Id. pt. 3 § 12, at 112. In discussing this process, Burke summarizes the objective characteristics of this aesthetic
ideal:
On the whole, the qualities of beauty, as they are merely sensible qualities, are the following. First,
to be comparatively small. Secondly, to be smooth. Thirdly, to have a variety in the direction of
the parts; but fourthly, to have those parts not angular, but melted as it were into each other.
Fifthly, to be of a delicate frame, without any remarkable appearance of strength. Sixthly, to have
its colours clear and bright; but not very strong and glaring. Seventhly, or if it should have any
glaring colour, to have it diversified with others. These are, I believe, the properties on which
beauty depends; properties that operate by nature, and are less liable to be altered by caprice, or
confounded by a diversity of tastes, than any others.
Id. § 18, at 117. Twentieth-century, post-Hegelian aesthetic theory has no room for such universality. See BUNGAY,
supra note 9, at 163.
16
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (1790).
17
There is a semantic distinction between an objective aesthetics and aesthetic objectivity. The former
refers to the Burkean or Kantian projects, largely discredited in a multi-cultural, pluralistic world in which diversity
is of paramount importance. The latter—aesthetic objectivity—refers to the avoidance of subjective aesthetic tastes
in making determinations, which, like an objective aesthetics, actually does not exist. See supra text accompanying
notes 7– 9. Despite the impossibility of such aesthetic objectivity, courts still strive for it in the balancing they must
do in copyright adjudication. See infra text accompanying notes 18–32
.
18
188 U.S. 239(1903) .
15

4
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outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”19 This determination is rooted in the policy
considerations behind copyright protection.
Copyright law revolves around the central policy debate between protecting author’s
rights to intellectual property and users’ rights. In truth, copyright facilitates both:
After more than two hundred years, copyright law in the United States has not
moved one degree from its central purpose: to promote the nation’s culture and
learning by encouraging authorship of original literary and artistic works. From
the start, copyright has promised authors and their publishers protection for the
product of their labors, and at the same time has ensured them the freedom they
need to borrow from the works of authors who precede them.20
Indeed, copyright in the United States has followed a path that protects authors’ rights in their
creations for the purpose of enabling public use of the works. “The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”21 This justifies the
“limited statutory monopoly”22 granted by the Copyright Act of 1909 in Twentieth Century
Music.
Congress’s decision to protect authors’ rights in original works only during the time
period specified in the Copyright Act23 produced this limited statutory monopoly. Essentially, in

19

Id. at 251-52. Justice Holmes goes on here to clarify the policy behind this mandate of objectivity:
At one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of
Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
commanded the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,—it would be bold to say
that they have not an aesthetic and educational value,—and the taste of any public is not to be
treated with contempt.
In this vein, Professor Yen notes that “the inherent ambiguity of aesthetics is considered incompatible with the
supposedly objective rules and principles that govern judicial opinions” in copyright adjudication. Yen, supra note
4, at 248.
20
1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT liii (2d ed. Supp. 2001).
21
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
22
Id.
23
The Copyright Act of 1790 protected author’s works for fourteen years after publication. Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124.

5
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1834, the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters determined that in passing the Copyright Act of
1790, Congress had created a right in authors to their works, “instead of sanctioning an existing
right. . . .”24 Thus, utilitarianism supports U.S. copyright theory rather than an approach
emphasizing the natural rights of the author in his or her work.25 By choosing this philosophy in
the debate between protecting authors’ rights and users’ rights, the Wheaton Court followed the
dissent in the seminal case construing the first statutory copyright law, the English Statute of
Anne.26 In one of the earliest Anglo-American copyright cases, Judge Yates dissented in the
1769 case of Millar v. Taylor, reasoning that
[t]he labours of an author have certainly a right to a reward: but it does not from
thence follow, that his reward is to be infinite, and never to have an end. Here, it
is ascertained. The Legislature have fixed the extent of his property: they have
allowed him twenty-eight years; and have expressly declared, he shall have it no
longer. Have the Legislature been guilty of injustice? Little cause has an author to
complain of injustice, after he has enjoyed a monopoly for twenty-eight years,
and the manuscript still remains his own property.27
Informed by this dissenting opinion, the Wheaton Court cemented the U.S. congressional
copyright posture favoring the economic rights of the author as limited by the statutory time
period.
This focus on the economic rights of the author during the statutory time period renders
Justice Holmes’s objectivity mandate in Bleistein particularly cogent for protecting these rights.
Not only does this theory of copyright tend to result in “ranking aspects of human activity,”
24

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834). In support, the Court reasoned as follows:
That congress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing rights, appears
clear, from the provision that the author, &c. [sic] “shall have the sole right and liberty of
printing,” &c. [sic]. Now if this exclusive right existed at common law, and congress were about
to adopt legislative provisions for its protection, would they have used this language? Could they
have deemed it necessary to vest a right already vested? Such a presumption is refuted by the
words above quoted, and their force is not lessened by any other part of the act.
25
See 1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, § 1.13.2, at 1:36 (“Natural rights theory extends copyright
protection automatically—as a matter of right—to every new form of literary and artistic work and against every
new use that is made of these works.”).
26
8 Ann. c. 19 (1710).
27
Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 232 (K.B. 1769) (Yates, J., dissenting).

6
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because it is “society’s way of stating how it values certain contributions by its citizens,”28 but
also through it, “[t]he possibility of censorship arises because copyright does not protect all
works. . . .”29 Therefore, this utilitarian approach can lead to government censorship, despite
Justice Holmes’s warning. This happens because “when courts interpret the contours of
copyrightable subject matter, they single out certain works for a special economic subsidy”; that
is, “people whose aesthetic sensibilities differ from the aesthetic sensibilities of judges might
have difficulty finding or creating art that they [the judges] prefer.”30 Realization of this
possibility influenced Justice Holmes’s statement in Bleistein, illustrat ed with reference to Goya
and Manet,31 and refocused courts’ attention toward applying the law blindly—or objectively.
This understanding also led to the belief that “[i]f judges avoid considering aesthetics in
copyright cases, aesthetic censorship seems logically impossible.”32 Unfortunately the solution is
not that easy due to the impossibility of objectivity in aesthetic reasoning.
Although impossible, judges still do their best to achieve objectivity in copyright
reasoning. Instead, this effort is a process of self-denial because “the distinction between
aesthetic reasoning and legal reasoning is illusory.”33 Moreover,
[j]udges seem quite conscious of the dangers identified with aesthetic reasoning
and therefore use legal reasoning to derive their conclusions. Nevertheless, the
analytical premises of copyright opinions are practically identical to those of
major aesthetic theories. Copyright law develops as judges change the premises
governing interpretation of the law. . . . The new premises seemingly eliminate
the controversy by directing judicial attention away from the aesthetically
troubling determinations existing precedent requires. . . . It is simply a matter of
time until the unanticipated nuances of future cases draw the courts back into
aesthetic controversy.34
28

Melissa M. Mathis, Note, Function, Nonfunction, and Monumental Works of Architecture: An
Interpretive Lens in Copyright Law, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 600 (2001).
29
Yen, supra note 4, at 248–49.
30
Id.
31
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
32
Yen, supra note 4, at 249.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 250.

7
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Admittedly, this process appears complex and counterintuitive at first. But it shows that
even insisting upon aesthetic objectivity in copyright adjudication does not avoid the problem of
de facto judicial subsidization35 of certain works of art over others. Rather, it merely covers overt
judicial aesthetic subsidization—as was possible before Bleistein—with legal reasoning that may
appear objective, but which actually still effects judicial bias from a subconscious level,
“because copyright law simply requires aesthetic choices.”36 Therefore, despite the appearance
of objectivity, at least in copyright cases, the maxim lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri
permittit37 can become dangerous. Justice Holmes acknowledged this notion in Bleistein by
demanding objectivity in copyright adjudication. No matter how “good” the individual’s
“judgment” is in such cases, the analytical framework chosen from which to apply legal
principles to the facts of the given case will already entail an unconscious aesthetic
determination that could result in subsidizing one form of aesthetic value over another. But the
courts should not therefore shrink from copyright decisions; rather, a legislative bright-line rule
can spare them from this danger.
B. Drifting to PGS Separability
Copyright protection enjoys Constitutional status. The Constitution invests Congress with
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times

35

See id. at 248–49; see also supra textaccompanying note 30.
Id. at 250. Although indeed complex, this process is quite natural because it is a means of avoiding the
problem that exacerbates the problem:
Judges [in copyright cases] do not overrule existing precedent when they adopt new analytical
perspectives. Analytically inconsistent cases therefore exist simultaneously as “good law.” This
means that the precedent which governs new cases may be inconsistent, and that the outcome of a
case could depend on the precedent a judge chooses to apply. To the extent that these
inconsistencies parallel differences in aesthetic theories, the judicial selection of controlling
precedent in a given case effectively becomes a choice among competing aesthetic theories. In
short, judges necessarily show a preference for certain aesthetic perspectives when they decide
cases because copyright law simply requires aesthetic choices.
37
See supra note 2.
36

8
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to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”38
And the way that Congress has subsequently chosen to secure authors’ rights in their own
“writings” has put courts “adrift on the murky sea of common law”39 regarding aesthetically
pleasing, but useful, articles.
1. Separate but not equal: aesthetics and utility in PGS works
In truth, Congress has not so much put judges adrift on a murky sea of common law as
bogged them down in a “quagmire of conceptual separability”40 through additions and
amendments over the last 200 years to the 1790 Copyright Act.41 Although the aesthetic element
in copyright cases never quite allowed the slow expansion of copyright protection before the
twentieth century smooth sailing in the courts, it was not until the Copyright Act of 1909
mentioned “works of art; models or designs for works of art”42 as copyrightable subject matter
that a new confusion in copyright law arose: fine arts v. industrial arts. Sixty-six years of
38

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Columbia Hyundai, Inc. v. Carll Hyundai, Inc., 484 S.E.2d 468, 470 (S.C. 1997) (employing the
common-law-as-murky-sea metaphor in the context of contract law).
40
Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.2d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., concurring).
41
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (proclaiming that the “author or authors of any map, chart, book,
or books, being a citizen or resident of the United States, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, and vending the same for the period of fourteen years from the recording of the title thereof in the clerk’s
office, as afterwards directed”). True, with the passage of time, American copyright law has evolved to protect more
forms of artistic creations under the constitutional mandate to protect “writings,” slowly keeping pace with
“international expectations,” Clark T. Thiel, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Gesture of 1990, Or,
“Hey, That Looks Like My Building!”, 7 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 35 (1996), but this
development has also steadily brought the courts into closer proximity with the eventual conundrum of conceptual
separability. The Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (holding a
photograph to be a protected “writing” in the constitutional sense) begins to relate this development, listing two
amendments to the Copyright Act; first, in 1802 to add etchings and engravings of an artist’s own work to the list of
protected works, 2 Stat. 171; and second, again in 1831 to protect musical compositions and to extend the duration
of copyright protection from fourteen to twenty-eight years, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. Three further
expansions preceded the 1990 AWCPA amendments to the Copyright Act: first, the Copyright Act of 1870 granted
protection to paintings, drawings, chromos, statues, statuaries, and “of models or designs intended to be perfected as
works of fine arts. . . ,” Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916); second, the Copyright
Act of 1909 added works of art and designs for works of art, Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075,
1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976)); and finally the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)), further broadened copyright protection of works of art, by
“expand[ing] from an enumerated list to a general principle,” Todd Hixon, Note, The Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act of 1990: At Odds with the Traditional Limitations of American Copyright Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 629,
640 n. 97 (1995).
42
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075, 1077.
39

9
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differentiating between these two types of creations through administrative statements and
common-law solutions43 led Congress to enact the Copyright Act of 1976,44 which statutorily
expanded copyright protection to pictorial, graphic, or structural works of art (“PGS works”),45
detailing how they relate to “useful articles.”46 But in defining PGS works, Congress clouded the
waters with the words “identified separately”:
[PGS works] shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a
useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from,
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.47
True, Congress was merely hoping “to draw as clear a line as possible between
copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design,”48 which may
qualify for patent or trademark protection, while at the same time reassuring that “the definition
of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ carries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste,
aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality.”49 Indeed, the House Report attempts to insulate this process
of separation from the invasion of judicial aesthetic bias by explaining that
although the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and
valuable, the Committee’s intention is not to offer it copyright protection under
the bill. Unless the shape of an . . . industrial product contains some element that,
physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian
aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill. The
test of separability and independence from ‘the utilitarian aspects of the article’
does not depend upon the nature of its design—that is, even if the appearance of
an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations,

43

See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
Pub. L. No. 94-553 (codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)).
45
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2004).
46
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
47
Id. (emphasis added).
48
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
49
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
44

10
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only elements, if any, which can be identified separately from the useful article as
such are copyrightable.50
But Congress’s goal of drawing a clear line between useful, utilitarian, or industrial articles and
their inherently aesthetic qualities—or their “attached” PGS works in the case of architectural
works—in the hope of creating an objective “test of separability” only partially succeeded. That
is, in many courts, this congressional goal resulted in a relatively straightforward test of
“physical separability”51; however, in others it spawned numerous common-law tests of
“conceptual separability” instead.
2. Prelude to a storm: Early conceptual separability
Aesthetic controversy lurks in the multiplicity of conceptual separability tests that have
surfaced to determine whether an aesthetic element of a useful article can gain copyright
protection. Congress may have intended to razorblade a distinction between a useful article and
its aesthetic features with its 1976 “test of separability” and its explanatory invitation to a
physical or conceptual separability analysis; but the Second Circuit aptly noted in KieselsteinCord v. Accessories by Pearl,52 an early conceptual separability case, that this distinction
actually located such situations “on a razor’s edge of copyright law”53 instead.
In Kieselstein-Cord, copyright protection was sought for decorative belt buckles boasting
sculptural designs. Apparently, the high-priced belt buckles were used principally for decoration
and some had even been accepted by the Metropolitan Museum of Art for its permanent
50

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668 (emphasis added).
1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, § 2.5.3, at 2:64 (“Courts hold that a pictorial, graphic or
sculptural feature incorporated in the design of a useful article is physically separated from the article without
impairing the article’s utility and if, once separated, it can stand alone as a work of art traditionally conceived.”)
Goldstein points out that the Copyright Office approaches these cases from this narrow construction of a
combination of the “test of separability” and the House Report’s elaboration on it. Id. at 2:63.
52
632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
53
Id. at 990. And often, despite admirable efforts at objective analysis in copyright cases dealing with
useful articles, an argumentum ad judicium reveals the judge’s aesthetic opinion as an important factor. See also
supra text accompanying notes 29–36for discussion of the illusory distinction between legal and aesthetic
reasoning.
51
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collection.54 The Second Circuit employed a primary/subsidiary test for conceptual separability,
finding that the items’ primary aesthetic function was conceptually separable from their potential
use as belt buckles, or their “subsidiary utilitarian function.”55 This espousal of a
primary/subsidiary approach played an important role when, five years later, the Second Circuit
revisited copyrightable (or not) aesthetics in useful articles in Barnhart v. Econ. Cover Corp.,56
forcing to the surface the aesthetic controversy beneath this area of copyright adjudication by
identifying a “bottomless pit” of “vague test[s].”57
C. Sinking in Conceptual Subjectivity
1. Lucky number seven: Aesthetic controversy in common-law conceptual separability
Numerous common-law conceptual separability tests followed Congress’s 1976 additions
to the Copyright Act. Specifically, the new definition of a PGS work in § 101 of the Act and the
House Report explaining § 101’s “identified separately” language both attempted to create a
clear standard without providing sufficient guidance in how to apply it.58
a. Newman’s five: a morass of conceptual separability. In Barnhart v. Econ. Cover
Corp., the court denied copyright protection to aesthetically pleasing mannequin torsos used for
modeling clothes, despite the plaintiff’s argument that the mannequins could be—and had
been—used sans clothing as window decorations because of their design.59 The court reasoned

54

Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 991.
Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
56
773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
57
Id., 773 F.2d at 419. In Barnhart, the majority addressed the Barnhart dissent’s position in a footnote,
noting that the dissent’s approach to conceptual separability and the list of other possible tests “only serves to
underscore the bottomless pit that would be created by such a vague test.” See infra Part II.C.1.a for an analysis of
Barnhart.
58
See id. at 420 (Newman, J., dissenting).
59
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418. This posture has been curiously labeled as “a general retreat on the part of the
Second Circuit regarding conceptual separability.” Michael A. Solomon, The Copyright of Useful Articles:
‘Conceptual’ Retreat in the Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 713, 729 (1986). True, the outcome in Barnhart was
opposite of Kieselstein-Cord, but not necessarily because the Barnhart court “retreated” from the primary/subsidiary
approach in Kieselstein-Cord. In short, Solomon argues that when the Barnhart court stated that “[n]or do we agree
that copyrightability here is dictated by our decision in Kieselstein-Cord,” Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418, the Second
55
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that conceptual separability demanded that the articles be just as useful when fully divorced from
any aesthetic elements; the mannequins here ceased to perform their function altogether when
conceptually separated from their aesthetic—and even traditional—art form of the human
torso.60 Judge Newman dissented in Barnhart on the grounds that the majority had either
misunderstood the “esoteric issue of conceptual separability” or applied the wrong standard.61 In
defining conceptual separability as “esoteric,” the dissent implied that this concept is
“communicated to, or intelligible by, the initiated exclusively.”62 Apparently the majority was

Circuit “distinguished” Kieselstein-Cord in the precedential sense, Solomon, supra at 728. Solomon acknowledges
that the court referenced the Kieselstein-Cord test in the context of the Barnhart forms, id., but he implies that this
was merely lip-service to precedent, inexplicably concluding instead that “[t]he court seems to have relied on its
own subjective belief that the forms could not be considered art,” and that it “appears to have ignored the
precedential force of Kieselstein-Cord entirely,” id. at 729. Solomon justifies this statement by magnifying the
similarities between the Kieselstein-Cord dissent and the Barnhart majority. Id. at 730.
But a close reading of Barnhart suggests that the court did follow Kieselstein-Cord by applying the
primary/subsidiary test. What “distinguished” Barnhart from Kieselstein-Cord, then, was not a Barnhart retreat
from conceptual separability precedent, but rather that the useful article in Barnhart—the mannequins—failed the
same primary/subsidiarity test that the belt buckles in Kieselstein-Cord had passed:
What distinguishes those buckles from the Barnhart forms is that the ornamented surfaces of the
buckles were not in any respect required by their utilitarian functions; the artistic and aesthetic
features could thus be conceived of as having been added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise
utilitarian article. The unique artistic design was wholly unnecessary to performance of the
utilitarian function. In the case of the Barnhart forms, on the other hand, the features claimed to be
aesthetic or artistic, e.g., the life-size configuration of the breasts and the width of the shoulders,
are inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the display of clothes.
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419. Far from retreating from conceptual separability, the Barnhart holding represents applied
conceptual separability. The purpose of conceptual separability tests is to screen out from copyright protection any
useful article that has no aesthetic element that can exist separately from the article’s utilitarian function. Closely
read, when the Barnhart court stated that the holding in Kieselstein-Cord five years earlier need not “dictate” its
decision in Barnhart, it meant that just because the belt buckles passed the test does not mean that the torsos must
pass that test as well.
It may be true that after five years the court was willing to apply this primary/subsidiary test more narrowly
than in Kieselstein-Cord, which had been “the most expansive interpretation of the statutory provisions regarding
useful articles to date.” Solomon, supra at 720-21. And it is certainly true that to some extent the Second Circuit
“relied on its own subjective belief that the forms could not be considered art,” id. at 729, because “no aesthetic
perspective can be neutral and all-encompassing,” and therefore, “aesthetic bias becomes inherent in copyright
decisionmaking because an aesthetic perspective must necessarily be chosen,” Yen, supra note 4, at 251. But this
does not necessarily also mean that the court excluded established Kieselstein-Cord precedent in relying on this
subjective aesthetic bias. Indeed, the impossibility of such objectivity is the focus of this Note.
60
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419.
61
Id. at 419 (Newman, J., dissenting).
62
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). Intimating that only a select initiated few have access to
the key to these copyright cases infringes the policy behind copyright law: to promote the creation of art by securing
the economic rights of artists to their works. See Michael W. Shiver Jr., Comment, Objective Limitations or, How
the Vigorous Application of “Strong Form” Idea/Expression Dichotomy Theory in Copyright Preliminary
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uninitiated, so the dissent proceeded to survey five—of the presumably infinite (read “bottomless
pit”63)—“esoteric” standards.64
Judge Newman admits that the “identified separately” language of § 101 of the Copyright
Act of 1976 established an “elusive standard”65 for deciding the copyrightability of useful
articles. This ambiguity necessitated the proliferation of the conceptual separability tests which
Judge Newman surveys in his dissent: (1) a primary/secondary test, (2) a primary/subsidiary
test, (3) a marketability test, (4) a sufficient aesthetic appeal test, and (5) Judge Newman’s own
temporal displacement test. First, in the primary/secondary test “an article used primarily to
serve its utilitarian function might be regarded as lacking ‘conceptually separable’ design
elements even though those design elements rendered it usable secondarily solely as an artistic
work.”66 Judge Newman found that this test potentially endangered the rights of a theoretical
minority in cases where “the designs of works of art . . . are also used by a majority as useful
articles.”67
Second, the primary/subsidiary test hails from Kieselstein-Cord, “uphold[ing] the
copyright whenever the decorative or aesthetically pleasing aspect of the article can be said to be
‘primary’ and the utilitarian function can be said to be ‘subsidiary.’”68 But this test was also
unsatisfactory for Judge Newman because “it offers little guidance to the trier of fact, or the
Injunction Hearings Might Just Save the First Amendment, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 361, 373 (2002) (discussing the
“impetus theory” behind the constitutional promotion of arts and sciences).
63
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 n.5.
64
Id. at 422-24 (Newman, J., dissenting) (listing and then rejecting four possible conceptual separability
tests in favor of a fifth approach which he suggested); see also 1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, § 2.5.3.1,
at 2:65 (summarizing these five conceptual separability options).
65
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 420 (Newman, J., dissenting).
66
Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
67
Id. (Newman, J., dissenting). And if the object is solely a useful article, then it cannot enjoy copyright
protection. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) (revoked 1978) (“If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility,
the fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art.”). The new definitions in
§ 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 for “useful article” and PGS works were essentially “adaptations of 37 C.F.R. §
202.10(a) and § 202.10 (c) (1959).” Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of
Useful Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 339, 346 (1990).
68
Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
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judge endeavoring to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists, as to what is being
measured by the classifications ‘primary’ and ‘subsidiary.’”69 Arguably, and the point is
contentious,70 the majority in Barnhart applied this test in denying protection to the Barnhart
forms; a close reading of the case suggests not that the Barnhart court retreated from conceptual
separability in denying protection to these forms but rather that the forms themselves failed this
test as applied.71 The forms’ artistic design—the proportions of the torso—were necessary to the
performance of the utilitarian function, as opposed to the belt buckles in Kieselstein-Cord, whose
“artistic design was wholly unnecessary to performance of the utilitarian function.”72
Furthermore, by stating that the forms’ aesthetic features “are inextricably intertwined with the
utilitarian feature,” the majority may be attempting to respond to the dissent’s condemnation of
the lack of guidance in the primary/subsidiary test, rather than coining an altogether new test.73
Third, Judge Newman evaluates Professor Nimmer’s marketability test. “Conceptual
separability exists where there is any substantial likelihood that even if the article had no
utilitarian use it would still be marketable to some significant segment of the community simply
69

Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
Not only is it argued that the Barnhart decision was a retreat from conceptual separability as framed in
Kieselstein-Cord, see Solomon, supra note 57, but also—in seizing upon the “inextricably intertwined” language of
the majority opinion in distinguishing the Barnhart forms from the Kieselstein-Cord buckles that merited copyright
protection—that the Barnhart majority framed its own inextricably intertwined test, a test which “borders on the
ludicrous.” Richard G. Frenkel, Note and Comment, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for Improving
Design Protection in the Post-TRIPs Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 531, 549 (1999) (arguing for a new category of
industrial design protection).
71
See supra note 59 for a discussion of the denial of copyrightability to the Barnhart forms under the
primary/subsidiary test from Kieselstein-Cord and a refutation of Solomon’s theory that Barnhart constituted a
“retreat” from conceptual separability.
72
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 (majority opinion).
73
Id. The fact that this clarification of the Kieselstein-Cord primary/subsidiary test may well be stricter
than the application of the test in Kieselstein-Cord because “any artistic features that are necessary to and
inextricably intertwined with the object’s utilitarian function will almost inevitably physically inseparable,”
Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 362, does not necessarily elevate it to the status of a new test. Indeed, under the
clarified primary/subsidiary test applied in Barnhart, the court expressly shows that the Kieselstein-Cord buckles
would still be copyrightable because “the ornamented surfaces of the buckles were not in any respect required by
their utilitarian functions” and were thus “superimposed upon” the utilitarian article, Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419, i.e.,
the buckles were not inextricably intertwined like the Barnhart forms, and they were therefore conceptually
separable. This casts doubt on Perlmutter’s assertion, since the aesthetic features of the buckles were not physically
separable, and yet still conceptually separable in the majority’s view.
70
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because of its aesthetic qualities.”74 In effect, this would subsidize artists of “popular art,” as
Nimmer understood.75 But Judge Newman dismisses this approach, explaining that “various
sculpted forms would be recognized as works of art by many, even though those willing to
purchase them for display in their homes might be few in number and not a ‘significant segment
of the community.’”76
Fourth, the aesthetic appeal test finds that “‘conceptual separability’ exists whenever the
design of a form has sufficient aesthetic appeal to be appreciated for its artistic qualities.”77
Although Judge Newman squarely opposes this test on the grounds that Congress has
unequivocally rejected such an aesthetic approach,78 one understanding of his own temporal
displacement test closely resembles it.
Fifth, Judge Newman rejected all of the foregoing tests in favor of his own temporal
displacement test. Deriving this test “from the word ‘conceptual,’” Judge Newman posits that
[f]or the design features to be ‘conceptually separate’ from the utilitarian aspects
of the useful article that embodies the design, the article must stimulate in the
mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its
utilitarian function. The test turns on what may reasonably be understood to be
occurring in the mind of the beholder or, as some might say, in the ‘mind’s eye’
of the beholder.79
The deliberation proceeds in the mind of the “ordinary, reasonable observer”80; the
“separateness” occurs when in this mind of the hypothetical beholder the “design creates . . . two

74

Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 421 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] at 2-96.2 (1985)).
75
See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 74, § 2.08[B], at 2-96.3.
76
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
77
Id.
78
Id. “The House Report makes clear that, if the artistic features cannot be identified separately, the work is
not copyrightable even though such features are ‘aesthetically satisfying and valuable.’” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 55 (1976)).
79
Id.
80
Id.
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different concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.”81 Judge Newman
acknowledges that this test can be applied in at least two ways and rejects the first, which very
closely resembles the aesthetic appeal test.82 Instead, he hopes that in applying the test, a court
would “insist that a concept, such as that of a work of art, is ‘separate’ from the concept of an
article’s utilitarian function only when the non-utilitarian concept can be entertained in the mind
of the ordinary observer without at the same time contemplating the utilitarian function.”83 The
result is a “temporal sense of separateness” that protects truly separable aesthetic creations while
disallowing copyrightability for “every design that can be appreciated as a work of art.”84
Commendably, Judge Newman does not ignore one of this test’s main weaknesses: the
aesthetic input required of the judges in such cases. This aesthetic element plagues not just
Newman’s test; it interferes with the whole field of conceptual separability. Newman concedes,
[i]n endeavoring to draw the line between the design of an aesthetically pleasing
useful article, which is not copyrightable, and the copyrightable design of a
useful article that engenders a concept separate from the concept of its utilitarian
function, courts will inevitably be drawn into some minimal inquiry as to the
nature of art. The need for inquiry is regrettable, since courts must not become
the arbiters of taste in any art or any other aspect of aesthetics.85
In light of this disclaimer, it is surprising that Judge Newman would advocate his temporal
displacement test over the majority’s primary/subsidiary test. Apparently, he did so in an effort
to afford more protection than available under the majority’s more conservative application of
81

Id.
Id. at 423. Judge Newman hopes this test will preserve the line “Congress has sought to maintain”
between aesthetic and useful articles; therefore, he discourages the approach that resembles the aesthetic appeal test:
Some might think that the requisite separability of concepts exists whenever the design of a form
engenders in the mind of the ordinary observer any concept that is distinct from the concept of the
form’s utilitarian function. . . . That approach, I fear, would subvert the Congressional effort to
deny copyright protection to designs of useful articles that are aesthetically pleasing. The
impression of an aesthetically pleasing design would be characterized by many as the impression
of a work of art, thereby blurring the line Congress has sought to maintain.
See also infra Part II.C.1.c. discussing Professor Perlmutter’s duality test, which substantially consists of this first
approach to Judge Newman’s temporal displacement test.
83
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
84
Id.
85
Id.
82
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the primary/subsidiary test. But the majority felt that Judge Newman went too far: “the difficulty
with [Judge Newman’s temporal displacement test] is that it uses as its yardstick a standard so
ethereal as to amount to a ‘non-test’ that would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
administer or apply.”86 The majority also found that the “illusory nature of the standard
suggested by Judge Newman” would defeat the purpose of conceptual separability by affording
protection to almost any industrial design, because “almost any utilitarian article may be viewed
by some separately as art, depending on how it is displayed.”87 In short, the majority accuses
Judge Newman’s test of too much latitude and Judge Newman contends that the majority’s test is
too restrictive.
b. Denicola’s spectrum of conceptual separability. To Judge Newman’s list of five
conceptual separability tests in his Barnhart dissent, the Second Circuit in Brandir Int’l, Inc. v.
Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.88 added a sixth variety that can be termed Denicola’s spectrum.89
Succinctly stated, Denicola’s spectrum is “a sliding scale between art and utility; the more a
work is influenced by utilitarian considerations, the less it can be copyrighted.”90 Quoting at
length from Professor Denicola’s article, the Second Circuit gave a more verbose formulation of
the test arising from Denicola’s spectrum: “if design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and
functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually
separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as
86

Id. at 419 n. 5 (majority opinion).
Id.
88
834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (enthusiastically considering Denicola’s spectrum as a solution,
stating that “[p]erhaps the differences between the majority and the dissent in Carol Barnhart might have been
resolved had they had before them the Denicola article. . . .”).
89
My term. See generally Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 (1983) (refuting the idea in the legislative history of the
Copyright Act of 1976 that there is any “clear line” at all in these cases, but rather a spectrum upon which
“copyrightability ultimately should depend on the extent to which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited
by functional considerations. Only such a direct assessment of the nature of the claimant’s contribution can
implement the congressional decision to exclude the general realm of industrial design, while preserving exclusive
rights in ‘applied art.’”).
90
Frenkel, supra note 70, at 550.
87
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reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences,
conceptual separability exists.”91 Professor Denicola explains that
[a]nalysis of the relationship between form and function is not new to copyright
law. In an effort to avoid monopolization of functional attributes, the law has long
denied protection in instances in which utilitarian requirements dictated a
particular form. The relationship between form and function, however, is seldom
so direct. Typically, a variety of forms will be compatible with functional
objectives. The choice is thus constrained rather than dictated. The separability
test, devised to exclude industrial design from the scope of copyright, suggests
that even this weaker relationship between form and function is sufficient to
preclude protection.92
In other words, this approach as initially envisioned by Professor Denicola in 1983 might not
have settled the dispute in Barnhart after all, since its restrictive nature may render it closer in
spirit to the Barnhart majority’s “inextricably intertwined” application of the primary/subsidiary
test93 than to Judge Newman’s more expansive temporal displacement test.
Even if Denicola’s spectrum as formulated in the Brandir Int’l test would have solved the
dispute between the majority and the dissent in Barnhart, it still fails to extract judges from what
makes conceptual separability the aesthetic quagmire that it is. That is, the Brandir Int’l test “is
itself conceptually difficult to apply—the test requires judicial analysis of artistic judgment.”94

91

Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 1145.
Denicola, supra note 89, at 741-42.
93
Indeed, although appearing to adopt a new test, the majority in Brandir Int’l willingly adopted Professor
Denicola’s spectrum test because it found that “the approach is consistent with the holdings of our previous cases
[Kieselstein-Cord and Barnhart].” 834 F.2d at 1145.
94
Frenkel, supra note 70, at 554. Frenkel poignantly addresses two examples of where this aesthetic
subjectivity has led to a split in subsequent caselaw. See Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452,
455 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying the Brandir Int’l test to Halloween costumes and finding clothing uncopyrightable on
the grounds that its aesthetic and utilitarian functions merge, and that clothes are inherently useful articles and not
copyrightable); cf. National Theme Productions, Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1353 (S.D. Cal.
1988) (quoting same passage in Brandir Int’l but holding that Halloween costumes were “not, however, designed to
optimize their function as clothing,” and thus copyrightable on the grounds that their function did not merge with
their form to the extent that would invalidate copyright). These cases exemplify the dangers of reliance on aesthetic
subjectivity in copyright law: in one jurisdiction, the courts effectively subsidized artists creating Halloween
costumes while in another, the courts denied the subsidy, see Yen, supra note 4, at 248 (explaining how courts
subsidize artistic creation through copyright law), and all with an arbitrary air although under the same federal
statutory language.
92
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Once again, such precedent could “embroil the courts in aesthetic controversy,”95 an aspect of
copyright law from which courts have tried to distance themselves since Justice Holmes
discommended aesthetic subjectivity in copyright adjudication in 1903.96 At one extreme, the
Brandir Int’l approach of measuring the aesthetic elements’ participation in the utilitarian
function can even “undermine the entire copyright scheme by declaring all artistic and creative
work utilitarian.”97 However, the Whimsicality outcome showed that the opposite can be true as
well, depending on the judge’s aesthetic insights.98 Unfortunately, then, this test likewise adds
little in the way of consistency of application or predictability in the field of conceptual
separability.
c. The Perlmutter duality test. After disposing of several of the above tests by
highlighting their “fundamental flaws,”99 Professor Perlmutter proposes a duality test—an
“adaptation of Judge Newman’s test”—for applying conceptual separability based on “duality
rather than displacement.”100 Essentially, this seventh test is the rejected first of two possible
applications of Judge Newman’s temporal displacement test, the aesthetic appeal test101:
This adaptation would preserve the core of [Judge Newman’s] test—the emphasis
on the ordinary observer’s ability to perceive the object as a work of art. It would
95

Yen, supra note 4, at 250.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
97
Peter K. Schalestock, Comment, Forms of Redress for Design Piracy: How Victims Can Use Existing
Copyright Law, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 113, 127 (1997) (arguing that the Brandir Int’l test as applied in
Whimsicality should be rejected much like the aesthetic functionality doctrine has been in trademark and trade dress
law).
98
See supra note 94 for a discussion of Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d
Cir. 1989).
99
Perlmutter, supra note 67, at 372-78 (striking down (1) the Denicola/Brandir approach because its
“emphasis on process is contrary to the language of the Copyright Act” and inconsistent with the spirit of Mazer,
and (2) Newman’s displacement test because although the test “has many advantages over the Denicola/Brandir
approach,” it is “more complex than necessary”).
100
Id. at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
See text accompanying notes 79–87
, supra Part II.C.1.a, for a discussion of Judge Newman’s proposed
test, the two possible applications of it, and Judge Newman’s rejection of the first application which closely
resembles Perlmutter’s duality test.
96
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drop, however, the ‘either/or’ aspect—the additional requirement that this
perception be capable of completely displacing the perception of usefulness.
Instead, it would be sufficient if the observer could perceive the article as having
both functions, whether simultaneously or one at a time.102
In proposing this test, Professor Perlmutter must confront not only the Barnhart majority’s
concerns that now speak even more strongly to her version of Judge Newman’s “non-test” than
they did to his “ethereal standard”103 itself, but also Judge Newman’s own justifications for
rejecting this expression of his temporal displacement test.104
Professor Perlmutter touts her test’s heightened practicability over the displacement test
and its conformity to congressional intent, “ruling out protection where observers see no more
than an aesthetically pleasing useful article.”105 But she struggles satisfactorily to address the
Barnhart majority’s main concern with Judge Newman’s test, which was itself more restrictive
than her test. “While it is possible that a particularly suggestive context could influence the
result, leading to the majority’s criticism in Carol Barnhart that ‘[a]lmost any utilitarian article
may be viewed by some separately as art, depending on how it is displayed,’ such a context
should not be conclusive.”106 Professor Perlmutter’s solution is a thus a skepticism towards
context, requiring courts to examine the object as it would be seen “by a reasonable person
outside of the extraordinary [artistic/aesthetic] context”107; but once again, this lands courts in a
“regrettable” aesthetic position where they will “inevitably be drawn into some minimal inquiry
as to the nature of art,”108 which led Judge Newman to discourage this application of his test.

102

Perlmutter, supra note 67, at 377.
Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The difficulty with
[Judge Newman’s] proposal is that it uses as its yardstick a standard so ethereal as to amount to a ‘non-test’ that
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to administer or apply.”).
104
See text accompanying notes 79–87for a discussion of Judge Newman’s justifications for rejecting this
possible application of his temporal displacement test.
105
Perlmutter, supra note 67, at 378.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 379.
108
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting).
103
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Nevertheless, Professor Perlmutter’s test is thoughtful and certainly workable—with the
understanding that it will not spare judges an ultimately dispositive recourse to aesthetic
subjectivity to decide these cases.
2. For a perfect ten: The Copyright Office alerts Congress to numerous tests
In a study commissioned by the congressional Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property and the Administration of Justice, the Copyright Office primed Congress for needed
changes in the Copyright Act of 1976 to include architectural works while circumventing the
esoteric conceptual separability tests.109 In underscoring the confusion surrounding copyrighting
PGS works doubling as useful articles, the report listed four different conceptual separability
tests: Newman’s “temporal displacement” test and three others.
a. The “Copyright Office” test. First, the Copyright Office outlined its own practice in
applying the conceptual separability test. Under this view, the PGS work must be physically
inseparable but still recognizable as a PGS work in its own right. This constitutes a conservative
interpretation of the “identified separately” language in the 1976 Act. That is, the PGS work
benefits from the designation of conceptually separable if “the artistic features can be imagined
separately and independently from the useful article without destroying the basic shape of the
useful article.”110 In essence, two separate entities must occupy the same space in order for the
Copyright Office to allow registration for PGS works attached to a useful article under the
mechanism of conceptual separability. “The artistic features and the useful article could both
exist side by side and be perceived as fully realized, separate works—one an artistic work, and

109

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
WORKS OF ARCHITECTURE 223-26 (1989) (providing Congress with four “Alternative Legislative Solutions”—
ranging from creating a new subject matter category for works of architecture to doing nothing and allowing the
courts to develop new legal theories of protection—based on the analysis in the preceding sections of the Copyright
Office study).
110
Id. at xviii.
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the other a useful article.”111 Absent this capacity for conceptual separation, the useful article
absorbs the purported PGS work, no matter how artistic. The judge must decide whether the PGS
work can be divorced from the useful article in this way on the basis of aesthetic judgment.
b. The “Wright test.” After describing Newman’s test, the Registrar of the Copyright
Office proceeds to detail a test suggested to it by the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation. In the
“Wright test,” the Foundation posits that “the test of conceptual separability should turn on
whether or not ‘the ordinary observer understands the work as having a conceptually dual
function—that of a work of art and that of a useful article.”112 More inclusive than the Copyright
Office’s own stricter approach, the Wright test seeks to allow “sculptural elements embodied in
works of architecture” to be “registrable if the conceptually separable sculptural elements
otherwise meet the originality requirements.”113 Thus, the “ordinary observer” in judge’s robes
may perceive “the existence of separable elements,” without requiring them “to exist ‘side by
side and be perceived as fully realized, separate works—one an artistic work, the other a useful
article.’”114 Not only would this approach expand protection to many PGS works previously
excluded as conceptually inseparable from a useful article, but it would invoke the judge’s
aesthetic determination as a matter of law and thus contribute to an undesirable—even though
unwilled—de facto subsidy for certain works.
c. The “two step” test. Finally, the fourth test presented by the Copyright Office for
Congress’s consideration in amending the Copyright Act of 1976 employs two questions to
ascertain conceptual separability. The vaguest test so far, this test again relies on the judge’s
aesthetic opinion in the form of the ordinary observer:
111

Id.
Id. at xix-xx.
113
Id. at xx.
114
Id. (refuting Judge Newman’s test in Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422
(Newman, J., dissenting)).
112
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(1) Can an ordinary observer conceive the presence of artistic features in a
structure such as the Guggenheim Musuem? (2) If so, are those features dictated
by the Guggenheim’s function as a museum? If not, then the artistic features are
conceptually separable and thus protectible [sic] under this theory. This approach
would find that the Guggenheim readily meets this standard.115
It is hard to imagine what building with any type of ornamentation would fail this test and thus
forego protection for perceived PGS works attached to the structure.
3. Ten is a crowd
This type of ambiguity in the interpretation of the statute—the necessity of at least ten
different, even contradictory, tests to give effect to the statutory language—exemplifies the need
for reform. Specifically, judges could easily drown in this excess of tests; merely choosing one
testifies to the judge’s aesthetic predilection,116 and the resultant decision on whether to allow
protection for the attached PGS work in question must in the end arise from the aesthetic taste of
the judge.
Approaching the proposed amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976—for the purpose of
bringing the U.S. in line with international copyright practice—Congress took note in 1990 of
the aesthetic problems of the conceptual separability tests. Congress hoped to replace this
conceptual separability conundrum with a bright line rule in conjunction with the new copyright
protection extended to architectural works under the 1990 law, as required in order to comply
with the broader international approach to structural copyright. The statutory history of the 1990
Act shows that Congress achieved this aim; but it was up to the court in Leicester to validate and
solidify it through careful and accurate construction of the Act.
III. ARCHITECTURE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Awaited Birth of a Bright-line Rule in the AWCPA
115

Id. at xx.
See Yen, supra note 4, at 250 (illustrating that the “distinction between aesthetic reasoning and legal
reasoning [in choosing the analytical approach to take] is illusory”).
116
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Architecture ranks high on aesthetes’ lists of art. “I call architecture frozen music,” noted
the lawyer-poet Goethe in 1827.117 The philosopher of aesthetics Hegel labeled architecture as
the “first of the arts.”118 And in 1886, on the heels of the German Publishers’ Association’s 1882
proposal for the formation of an international copyright union, The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works broadly extended protection to “every production
whatsoever in the literary, scientific, or artistic domain which can be published by any mode of
impression or reproduction,”119 including “plans, sketches, and plastic works relative to
architecture.”120 Ten countries signed the treaty at the time; some of these countries’ vast

117

CONVERSATIONS WITH ECKERMANN, BEING APPRECIATIONS AND CRITICISMS ON MANY SUBJECTS BY
JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE 114 (preface by Eckermann, intro. and trans. by Wallace Wood, 1901) (1827).
Although Goethe considered jurisprudence to be “among his least talents,” Eberhard Schmidhäuser, Goethes Denken
über Recht und Staat—aus der Sicht von Gestern und Heute, in 116 GOETHE-JAHRBUCH 178, 179 (1999), Goethe
studied and then practiced law in pre-copyright Germany, writing poems and storm-and-stress literature—such as
the 1774 European bestseller The Sorrows of Young Werther—on the side until the propitious day in 1775 when the
Duke Karl August invited him to resettle to Weimar under the official sponsorship of the small principality. Such
sponsorship was the preferred solution for talented artists—whether musicians, poets, painters, or even architects,
such as Berlin’s Karl Friedrich Schinkel—in the absence of copyright laws enabling an artist to live by his or her
work. This sponsorship was Goethe’s good fortune; Friedrich Schiller, Goethe’s contemporary and “intellectual
opposite,” GOETHE, Glückliches Ereignis, in 10 JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE WERKE 538, 540 (Hamburg
Edition, DTV, 1998) (1817) (relating autobiographically that his philosophical and artistic perspective and methods
separated him from Schiller “by more than the diameter of the earth” even though the two worked closely together
in their literary endeavors) who famously penned the Ode to Joy (1785) and William Tell (1801), did not fare so well
in earning a living by his art. FRIEDRICH CHRISTIAN SCHILLER, Letter to C.G. Körner, 09 March 1789, in Der
BRIEFWECHSEL ZWSICHEN SCHILLER UND GOETHE 9 (Ed. Emil Staiger, Insel 1966) (lamenting his own more
difficult circumstances after meeting Goethe for the first time and revealing his initial profound dislike for Goethe’s
methods—and perhaps jealousy of the artistic freedom that Goethe’s sponsorship by the court allowed him). Lack of
copyright protection for Schiller’s works almost ruined him at first; the constant necessity of making ends meet
plagued him throughout his life, T.J. REED, SCHILLER 36 (1984), influenced him to turn from his literature for an
entire decade while he taught as professor of history at the University of Jena and studied Kantian philosophy,
LESLEY SHARPE, FRIEDRICH SCHILLER: DRAMA, THOUGHT, AND POLITICS 96-108 (1991), and perhaps contributed to
his early death in 1805 at age 46. Similar concerns for the economic rights of architects e.g. in their monumental
works have been raised following enactment and as a result of the AWCPA. Mathis, supra note 28, at 602.
118
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik II, in 14 WERKE 266 (Eva
Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, eds., 1970) (1830).
119
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT. PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 21 (2001) (quoting
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. IV).
120
Natalie Wargo, Copyright Protection for Architecture and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
403, 409 (1990) (quoting The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art.
IV). Obviously, this language did not yet provide express protection for works of architecture themselves. But in
1887, the Association littéraire et artistique internationale (ALAI)—founded in 1878 and presided over by the
famed romanticist author Victor Hugo, STEPHEN P. LADAS, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 71-83 (1938) (providing general background for the ALAI)—“announced that works of
architecture must enjoy the same protection as works of literature and fine arts,” Wargo, supra at 410 n. 31,
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colonial holdings gave the treaty’s coverage global proportions.121 The Paris Text of 1971 is the
current text of the Berne Convention and now expressly includes architectural works in its
protected subject matter.122 But European conceptions of artists’ moral rights—as opposed to the
American adherence to economic rights in copyright—together with the Convention’s
prohibition of formalities in obtaining protection for creative works123 long repelled the United
States from signing.124 Finally, a century later, after America had dominated the world export of

spearheading a movement to include architectural works as part of the protected subject matter. Since some
countries at this time, such as France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland, already implicitly extended protection
to architectural works as artistic works, id. at 409 n. 28, this movement largely focused on convincing skeptical
countries such as Britain, Germany, and Norway that the proposed amendment would not encompass “even the most
mundane or common structures,” id. at 411. At the Paris Conference in 1896, following a decade of debate on the
status of architectural works after the Berne Convention, delegates committed to expanding the subject matter
protection to architectural works identified what they saw as a “loophole” in the protection afforded to architectural
works under the 1886 Berne Convention: the language essentially “afforded protection against two-dimensional
reproductions of an architect’s plans but did not prohibit construction of a building from those plans” and that
“works of architecture created without blueprints received no protection at all.” Id. By the 1908 Berlin Revision
Conference, the skeptical countries, with the exception of Norway, had been convinced by the other delegates and
lobbying architects to expand the protection officially, defining “works of architecture” as protected works. Id. at
412-13. It is interesting to note that the Berne Convention’s position in 1886 towards protection of architectural
works, with its attendant “loopholes,” foreshadows the asymmetrical status quo of copyright protection for
architectural works in the United State until 1990.
121
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 119, at 21 (2001) (quoting SAM RICKETSON, THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 79 (1987) (“Despite
this relatively limited membership [ten original signers], the geographical sweep of the new Union [of countries
affording such protection] was considerable when account is taken of the colonial possessions of France, Germany,
Italy, Belgium, Spain, and the UK.”)). Significantly, the United States finally decided to sign on to this treaty 103
years later. Id. at 20 n. 39.
122
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(1) 828
U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Text, 1971) (as amended Oct. 2, 1979) (hereinafter “the Berne Convention”) (including as
protected subject matter “works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography . . .
illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or
science”).
123
Id. art. 5(2); cf. Copyright Act 1909, ch. 320, §§ 10, 14, 24, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-533, §§ 401-412, amended by Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
701, 703, 104 (codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 102(a)(8), 120) (2000) (laying out formal requirements for obtaining
copyright protection: notice, registration, renewal, and deposit of copies). Interestingly, the prohibition of these
formalities was first introduced into the Berlin Text of the Berne Convention in 1908, one year before the United
States revised its own copyright laws to require these formalities. GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, supra
note 119, at 21.
124
Wargo, supra note 120, at 409. Also, contributing significantly to U.S. delay in joining the Berne
Convention was the availability of “backdoor” access to the heightened level of protection offered by the doctrine of
moral rights in the Berne Convention. Leonard D. DuBoff et al., Out of UNESCO and Into Berne: Has United States
Participation in the Berne Convention for International Copyright Protection Become Essential? 4 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 203, 211 (1985) (“Some of the pressure for United States adherence to the Berne Convention was
relieved by the so-called ‘backdoor approach’ whereby a simultaneous publication of a United States copyrighted
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copyrighted works since the end of World War I,125 the United States decided to join the Berne
Convention Union126 to protect its interests as the top copyright exporter.127
Thus was born the AWCPA: membership in the Berne Convention demanded inclusion
of architectural works as protected copyright subject matter. On the strategy of a “minimalist
approach” then,128 the AWCPA extends copyright protection to architectural works. But in
reality, the AWCPA does more than this alone—structurally it reexamines the relationship
between architectural works and attached PGS works,129 but not without side effects.130 As a

work in a Berne signatory country, such as Canada, provided protection for that work in all of the member states of
the Berne Convention.”).
125
The Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the S. Subcomm. On Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 142-43 (1988) (statement of Ralph
Oman, Register of Copyrights).
126
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). However, Congress
failed to give adequate attention to at least one area in which United States copyright protection
failed to meet the Berne Convention requirements: architectural works. Because the Berne
Convention requires that member nations extend full copyright protection to architectural works,
Congress requested that the Copyright Office determine whether the existing copyright law
adequately protected architectural works to minimally meet the Berne Convention’s requirements.
Thiel, supra note 41, at 17–18. This necessitated the AWCPA.
127
ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 874 (4th ed. 1993) (noting
the massive losses resulting from large scale international piracy of U.S. exported copyright works).
128
Thiel, supra note 41, at 17 & n. 113.
129
According to the useful article doctrine, an inhabitable building was a utilitarian article and thus not
copyrightable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668; see infra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of how the useful article doctrine applied to
architectural works before 1990. However, under the Copyright Act of 1976, “selected works of architecture—those
containing elements physically or conceptually separable from their utilitarian function—would be protected to the
extent of their separabilty.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6942. In
other words, if a utilitarian, i.e. nonmonumental, work of architecture contained attached PGS works that could pass
on of the many conceptual separability tests that sprang up after the Copyright Act of 1976, then those attached PGS
works might be copyrightable even though the overall building was not copyrightable as a useful article. After the
AWCPA, which extends copyright protection to architectural works for the first time, “it [was] unclear whether
copyright law offers copyright protection for purely aesthetic features incorporated in architectural structures as
sculptural works,” that is, as PGS works subject to the conceptual separability tests. Thiel, supra note 41, at 34. This
uncertainty stemmed from vagueness in the statute. Thus, as of 1996, “it remain[ed] to be seen . . . whether
sculptural components of an architectural work [were] protected as visual arts or as architectural works” because no
court had addressed the issue in a written opinion as of that time. Thiel, supra note 41, at 25 & n.164. In Leicester v.
Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit weighed in on the issue, holding that attached PGS
works now share the copyright protection of the building to which they are attached. See infra Part IV for an
evaluation of the Leicester holding.
130
For example, “language in the legislative history of the AWCPA, perhaps faulty, perhaps gratuitous,
appeared to change the categorization of monuments from sculptural works to architectural works,” a
reclassification which “results in a reduced level of protection” for the authors of nonfunctional, purely monumental
works of architecture. Mathis supra note 28, at 598–99. This reduced protection is a result of the limitations in the
AWCPA for the copyright of architectural works. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of the AWCPA’s pictorial
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result, an apparent loss of rights by authors of attached PGS works has since been decried131;
there have been fears that monumental works of architecture, previously fully protected by the
nature of their nonfunctionality, might lose this status if now redefined as works of architecture
under the AWCPA132; and the AWCPA has been deemed flawed for allegedly depriving
architects of a significant market interest in their works.133 But the AWCPA has also since been
lucidly construed134 to effectuate Congress’s initiative—in the form of a bright line rule—both to
extend protection to architectural works and to extract judges from the quagmire of conceptual
separability135 surrounding the copyrightability of PGS works, or the “aesthetic controversy” in
which “existing precedent embroils the courts”136 in supposedly objective copyright
adjudication.
B. Architectural Copyrightability in America Before 1990
1. Functionality: the destroyer of copyrightability in architectural works
Before the AWCPA created a “general functionality exception”137 in 1990 for
architectural works in order to comply with the requirements of the Berne Convention,
architectural works were subject to the same idea-expression dichotomy that rendered utilitarian

representation limitation in the copyright of architectural works. Also, the fact that attached PGS works receive the
same copyright protection as the architectural work itself under the AWCPA, which is subject to some limitations,
authors of PGS works who previously stood to obtain full copyright protection of their works if they could surmount
one of the conceptual separability tests now find their works subject to the same limitation of protection as the
underlying architectural work. Jay Orlandi, Comment, Gargoyles in Gotham: A Sculpture Incorporated Into an
Architectural Work Should Retain Independent Copyright Protection, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 617, 629 (2000).
131
See generally Orlandi, supra note 130 (writing with the Ninth Circuit as an audience, advocating
reversal of the district court’s decision in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501, 1998 WL 34016724 (C.D.
Cal.) on the basis that the AWCPA’s new configuration should not abridge preexisting copyright protection for PGS
works incorporated into an architectural work).
132
Mathis, supra note 28, at 598-99 (approving of inclusion of architectural works as protected subject
matter but wary of the implications of AWCPA’s language for the separate category of monuments).
133
Thiel, supra note 40, at 35 (arguing that the AWCPA’s pictorial representation exemption should be
eliminated because it “arbitrarily restricts the architect’s right to control derivative works”).
134
In Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
135
See supra Part II.C for an investigation of the different conceptual separability tests used in copyright
adjudication about PGS works constituting this quagmire.
136
Yen, supra note 4, at 250.
137
1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, § 2.15.1 at 2:185.
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articles uncopyrightable. Hailing from Baker v. Selden,138 the idea-expression dichotomy
provides that copyright protects only an author’s expression and not the useful idea being
expressed. In Baker, this meant that although a book describing a new book-keeping system
might be copyrightable, anyone could freely make use of the system itself described in the book
because this was a useful idea and not a copyrightable original expression.139 Congress codified
this fundamental of American copyright law in the Copyright Act of 1976.140 As a natural
application of the Baker idea-expression posture, architectural plans were the architect’s
“writings” and thus benefited from copyright protection as PGS works.141 But absent a provision
specifically treating architectural works, the structures themselves defaulted to the category of
PGS works and became subject to the “useful articles limitation,”142 as codified in § 101 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. The useful articles doctrine denied protection to articles “having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information,”143 on the basis of the idea-expression dichotomy. Therefore, before the
AWCPA removed architectural works from joint consideration with PGS works, copying an
architect’s blueprints constituted a copyright infringement but no copyright provision precluded
138

101 U.S. 99 (1879).
Id. at 104. Extending copyright protection past the expression of the idea to the useful idea itself, thus
precluding others’ application and use of the idea would violate public policy:
[T]he teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful art have their final end in
application and use; and this application and use are what the public derive from the publication of
a book which teaches them. But as embodied and taught in a literary composition or book, their
essence consists only in their statement. This alone is what is secured by the copyright. The use by
another of the same methods of statement, whether in words or illustrations, in a book published
for teaching the art, would undoubtedly be an infringement of the copyright.
Id., at 103-104 (emphasis added).
140
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004) (providing that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work”).
141
Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he architect who originates a
set of blueprints for a dwelling is as much an author for copyright purposes as the writer who creates an original
novel or the dramatist who pens a new play.”); see also David E. Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural
Works, 37 S.C. L. REV. 393, 396-400 (1986) (outlining the state of copyrightability of architectural plans as of
1986).
142
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 74, § 2.08[D][2][b], at 2-125.
143
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
139
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someone from simply using the plans themselves to construct an identical replica.144 The court in
Demetriades v. Kaufmann confirmed this result finding “consistent with Baker . . . that although
an owner of copyrighted architectural plans is granted the right to prevent the unauthorized
copying of those plans, that individual, without benefit of a design patent, does not obtain a
protectable interest in the useful article depicted by those plans.”145 Thus, before the 1990
enactment of the AWCPA, functionality in architectural works—any aspect that made the
structure a “useful article,” such as e.g. inhabitability—automatically excluded architectural
works from protection under the useful article doctrine.
2. The nonfunctionality exception and conceptual separability in architectural works
However, nonfunctional works of architecture constituted an exception to the general rule
that functionality precluded copyrightability in architectural works. Nonfunctional architectural
works were copyrightable as sculpture under the definition of PGS works in the Copyright Act of
1976: “[p]urely nonfunctional or monumental structures would be subject to full copyright
protection under the bill and the same would be true of artistic sculpture or decorative
ornamentation or embellishment added to a structure.”146 But the latter—“artistic sculpture or
decorative ornamentation or embellishment added to a structure”—would have to survive the

144

Imperial Homes, 458 F.2d at 899 (“[N]o copyrighted architectural plans . . . may clothe their author with
the exclusive right to reproduce the dwelling pictured.”).
145
680 F. Supp. 658, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184,
196 (D.C. Fla. 1962) (showing the long-term consistency of this approach based on Baker—despite “continuing
statutory silence [as of 1986],” Shipley, supra note 141, at 395, in the United States Code about whether
architectural works impliedly qualify for protection as PGS works—when combined with Demetriades by holding
that “[t]he [implied] protection extended by Congress to the proprietor of a copyright in architectural plans does not
encompass the protection of the buildings or structures themselves, but it is limited only to the plans.”).
Furthermore, even though Congress did not explicitly write the protection of architectural plans into the 1976
Copyright Act, the Act’s legislative history reveals that they took this assumption for granted: “An architect’s plans
and drawings would, of course, be protected by copyright . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
146
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
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conceptual separability tests spawned by the 1976 Act’s “identified separately” language.147 By
contrast, purely monumental works of architecture avoided the separability tests altogether
precisely because of their nonfunctionality. That is, before the AWCPA of 1990, sculpture or
embellishment that attached to a functional work of architecture might have been copyrightable
if it survived one of the numerous separability tests used to determine whether it could exist
either physically or conceptually separately from the useful article, which is in this case a work
of architecture, whereas the nonfunctional work of architecture is not a useful article and thus
merits copyright as an expression by its own right. The AWCPA of 1990 changed this regime by
offering even functional works of architecture copyright protection in their own right.
C. Filling the Void with the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990
In 1990, in fulfillment of its obligations under the recently passed Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976 to extend copyright
protection to architectural works. In doing so, Congress introduced a bright-line rule to
determine the copyrightability of architectural works for the express purpose of avoiding the
complications of the separability tests.148 This approach spares judges from deciding whether the
structure at issue merits protection or not under the conceptual separability tests—based on the
aesthetic judgments that unavoidably inhere in those tests—while at the same time fulfilling their
Bleistein obligation of aesthetic objectivity in copyright adjudication.
1. The additions: first time protections for architectural works (§§ 101, 102(a)(8))

147

See supra Part II.C for a discussion of ten of the numerous conceptual separability tests used to
determine the extent to which an aesthetic article can exist separately of a useful article to which it is attached in
order to determine whether the incorporated aesthetic article merits protection.
148
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951 (“There is considerable
scholarly and judicial disagreement over how to apply the separability test, and the principal reason for not treating
architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works is to avoid entangling architectural works in this
disagreement.”).
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In order to extend copyright protection to architectural works, Congress made two
additions to the text of the Copyright Act of 1976 as codified in Title 17 in the United States
Code. First, in § 101, Congress defined “architectural work” as
the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression,
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the
overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements
in the design, but does not include individual standard features.149
Including architectural plans or drawings in this definition meant that such plans and drawings
now enjoy dual protection.150 That is, even before the AWCPA included plans and drawings in
the definition of protected architectural works, the Copyright Office and various courts had
already extended them protection as PGS works—even though they were not expressly
mentioned in any earlier copyright law.151 Congress acknowledged that it intended this effect in
wording the definition of “architectural works” in this way: “An individual creating an
architectural work by depicting that work in plans or drawing will have two separate copyrights,
one in the architectural work . . . , the other in the plans or drawings . . . . Either or both of these
copyrights may be infringed and eligible separately for damages.”152 Thus, the plans and
drawings are protected both as PGS works under the existing § 102(a)(5) and also as
architectural works under the new § 102(a)(8).
The second addition, then, that the AWCPA made to the Copyright Act of 1976 was the
insertion of language into § 102 incorporating architectural works into the subject matter of
copyright. Specifically, § 102(a)(8) adds “architectural works” to the enumerated list of “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium or expression, now known or later developed,
149

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
Raphael Winick, Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1614–15 (1992).
151
Raleigh W. Newsam II, Architecture and Copyright: An Analytical Framework for Separating the
Poetic from the Prosaic, 41 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 251, 253–54(1997).
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H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950.
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from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.”153 With this addition, functional works of architecture
attained copyright protection for the first time.
2. The exceptions: § 120(a), (b)
Although the AWCPA extended copyright protection to architectural works for the first
time, it did not do so without some limitations that other copyrightable subject matter does not
face. Because public works of art such as architecture serve an undeniable public function,
Congress felt constrained to provide for a certain amount of public use of the architectural work
by adding a “pictorial representations” limitation to the copyrightability of architectural works.154
Furthermore, considering practical issues attendant to the ownership of architectural works—
aside from owning the copyright to the architectural works—Congress enacted an “alterations to
and destruction of buildings” limitation to the AWCPA.155
The pictorial representations limitation of the AWCPA gives architectural works less
protection that other copyrighted works under the Copyright Act. Congress found that
“[a]rchitecture is a public art form and is enjoyed as such. Millions of people visit our cities
every year and take back home photographs, posters, and other pictorial representations of
prominent works of architecture as a memory of their trip.”156 Thus, Congress provided in the
AWCPA that “[t]he copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include
the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings,
photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is
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17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2004).
17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2004).
155
17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (2004).
156
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953
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embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.”157 That is, if an architectural
structure is ordinarily visible from a public space, the copyright holder cannot prevent such
pictorial representations from being made of it on public policy grounds. In this sense, then,
artists whose works are protected under the AWCPA with its pictorial representations limitation
receive less protection than if their works were considered PGS works that are not subject to this
limitation.158 Of course, “authors” of functional works of architecture had no claim to copyright
protection at all before the AWCPA.
In addition to providing for a certain extent of public use of architectural works, Congress
limited the AWCPA in the interest of preventing the ossification of the building market.
Specifically, the AWCPA provides that “the owners of a building embodying an architectural
work may, without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the architectural work, make
or authorize the making of alterations to such building, and destroy or authorize the destruction
of such building.”159 The legislative history reveals that Congress felt that this provision was
uncontroversial, necessary, and justifiable under existing copyright practice.160 Thus, despite
concerns about the welfare of monuments if they now fall under the AWCPA rather than the §
102(a)(5) provisions for PGS works as nonfunctional works of architecture,161 the § 120(b)
limitation for alteration to or destruction of buildings that now merit copyright protection under §
102(a)(8) allows owners to move forward with their market-oriented plans unencumbered by an
artist’s copyright.
3. Implications of the AWCPA of 1990
157

17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2004).
See generally Orlandi, supra note 130.
159
17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (2004).
160
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22 & n.51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953.
161
See Mathis, supra note 28, at 611–24 for a discussion of the controversy that the AWCPA has
engendered because it seems to remove monumental or nonfunctional works of architecture from the § 102(a)(5)
PGS works regime to the new § 102(a)(8) regime of architectural works.
158
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a. Creating a bright-line rule for the protection of architectural works. The AWCPA
extended copyright protection to architectural works on the basis of a bright-line determination
specifically meant to avoid the numerous conceptual separability tests. Congress seems to have
realized the false dichotomy embodied in expecting judges “[t]o understand the conceptual artarchitecture distinction,” or requiring them “to recognize that there must be some line separating
art from architecture.”162 In doing so, Congress acknowledged that avoidance of conceptual
separability largely motivated their legislative creation of § 102(8)(a): “the principal reason for
not treating architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works is to avoid entangling
architectural works in this [scholarly and judicial] disagreement [over how to apply the
separability tests].”163 Instead, Congress “envisioned” implementing this bright-line rule through
a “two step analysis.”164 Stated succinctly, the analysis proceeds noticeably absent of any
aesthetic determinations:
[t]he first prong examines whether the architectural work contains original
elements, including its overall form and interior design. If original design
elements are present, the second step examines whether the elements are
‘functionally required.’ Only those design elements not functionally required are
protectable without regard to ‘physical or conceptual separability.’165
However, if design elements are functionally required, then they are not protected by copyright
at all, similarly without regard to the “separability conundrum”166 surrounding the
copyrightability of PGS works that are also useful articles.
b. Subsuming attached PGS works. The bright-line rule for protecting architectural works
under the AWCPA also extends to PGS works attached to a building found to be copyrightable
162

Orlandi, supra note 130, at 621 (advocating the identification of such a line between art and architecture
in proposing a new six-factor test to accompany the numerous existing separability tests, but specifically in
determinations about the copyrightability of PGS works attached to works of architecture).
163
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951.
164
Id.
165
Newsam, supra note 151, at 255–56.
166
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6952.
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under that bright-line rule. Whereas before the AWCPA such attached PGS works might warrant
protection separately from a functional—and thus uncopyrightable167—work of architecture if
the PGS work passed one of the numerous conceptual separability tests, the attached PGS work
now gains protection based on the bright-line test for the building to which it is attached.168
Thus, authors of PGS works attached to copyrighted building cannot seek separate copyright
protection for their works.169 Although this might indeed occur to the detriment of authors of
attached PGS works viewed in the most negative light, it also promotes a greater good by
introducing a bright-line rule that spares judges the aesthetic subsidization that results from their
choice of one of the many conceptual separability tests in adjudicating about attached PGS
works.170 Furthermore, viewed more positively, rather than depriving authors of economic rights,
this actually strengthens authors’ bargaining power in contracting for the job in the first place.171
IV. LEICESTER V. WARNER BROS.

AND THE BRIGHT LINE IN THE AWCPA

Although Congress created a bright-line rule for use in the copyrightability of
architectural works, the language of the statute demonstrated an ambiguity that might have
landed attached PGS works back in the conceptual separability quagmire. That is, an attached
PGS work might have been considered in its own right under § 102(a)(5) rather than as part of
the copyright of the architectural work, now protected under § 102(a)(8), to which it was

167

See supra text accompanying notes 137–145.
Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000).
169
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 n.41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950 (“The Subcommittee
was aware that certain works of authorship which may separately qualify for protection as pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works may be permanently embodied in architectural works. Stained glass windows are one such
example. Election is inappropriate in any case where the copyright owner of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
embodied in an architectural work is different from the copyright owner of the architectural work.”).
170
See Yen, supra note 4, at 250.
171
See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1224 n.4.
168
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attached. But in Leicester v. Warner Bros.,172 the Ninth Circuit lucidly interpreted the AWCPA’s
bright-line rule, giving effect to the legislative intent behind the Act in doing so.
A. Ensuring Realization of Legislative Intent in Leicester
The Ninth Circuit held the AWCPA’s bright line in Leicester by rejecting arguments that
the structure at issue was conceptually separable and thus did not fall into the § 120(a) pictorial
representation limitation of architectural work copyrightability.173 The court thus did not base its
decision on conceptual separability, a quagmire previously unentered by the Ninth Circuit.174
Essentially, the court resisted the temptation to play an activist role by choosing to employ the
conceptual separability test to reach results that the equities might have seemed to demand on a
superficial level, opting instead to apply the law as written in the statute, any imperfections in the
language notwithstanding.
1. Revisiting the relationship between architecture and attached PGS works in Leicester
Before 1990, a PGS work attached to a functional architectural work, which would not be
copyrightable as a useful article, might have been eligible for copyright protection subject to
passing one of the conceptual separability tests. Under the doctrine of conceptual separability,
“an element of expression that is related to a useful object may be deemed conceptually
separable (and thus, independently protectable) if it can stand on its own as a work of art
traditionally conceived.”175 But following the AWCPA, attached PGS works no longer face
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232 F.3d 1212 (2000).
See id. at 1219.
174
Id. at 1222 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“[T]his circuit has never addressed the conceptual separability
doctrine and there is no uniform standard elsewhere.”).
175
David A. Roberts, There Goes My Baby: Buildings as Intellectual Property Under the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act, 21 SPG CONSTR. L. 22, 25 (2001). Of course, that is just a simple statement of the
conceptual separability doctrine. In truth, the “identified separately” language added to § 101 by the Copyright Act
of 1976 in providing protection for PGS works has given rise to a number of different tests for determining whether
the aesthetic element is separable from the useful element in a PGS work. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of ten
of these tests.
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separate treatment from the architectural works to which they are attached if they constitute an
“integrated part”176 of the whole, as held by the Leicester court.
a. Of Batman and Zanja Madre. In Leicester, artist Andrew Leicester sued Warner Bros.
for breach of copyright after the studio filmed part of his artistic creation known as Zanja Madre
as background for a couple of scenes in the 1994 movie Batman Forever.177 Specifically, both
the four streetwall towers of Zanja Madre—which contributed to the overall structure of the 801
Tower in downtown Los Angeles—and the 801 Tower itself, served in the film as the Second
Bank of Gotham, “where nefarious deeds occur before Batman comes to the rescue.”178 In 1989,
Leicester had been commissioned by the developer to contribute a work of public art to the
architectural work of John Hayes in constructing the 801 Tower and the surrounding property
because the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Authority (“CRA”) expected the developer
to “make a percent for art expenditure or to pay CRA to construct public art in connection with
the development.”179 The CRA required the artistic development to complete the project area,
since “the 801 Tower would not occupy the entire lot,”180 and expected the “building facade and
entrance to the courtyard [of the Zanja Madre work of public art] to share common artistic and
architectural elements.”181 This was significant because both Leicester and Hayes “worked
together to this end” with Leicester producing three plans, the first two of which were rejected by
the CRA and the developer respectively.182 When Leicester’s third plan183 was approved by both
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Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215.
Id. at 1213.
178
Id. at 1215.
179
Id. at 1214.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. This 1991 plan outlined the “Zanja Madre” that Leicester finally created, which “tell[s] an allegorical
story of the history of Los Angeles”:
In the courtyard proper, there is a fountain consisting of a rock split by an arrowhead from which
water flows through a channel representing the “Mother Ditch,” or Zanja Madre, which brought
177
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the developer and the CRA, Leicester “executed a written contract acknowledging that Zanja
Madre was a product of the collaborative design efforts of the artist and architect”184 and giving
the developer “a perpetual irrevocable license to make reproductions of Zanja Madre.”185 As
required by the CRA and the developer, Leicester’s work of art shared design elements with the
801 Tower; particularly the streetwall portion of Leicester’s work on Figueroa Street constituted
a visible continuation of the overall design of the tower.186
Warner Bros. approached the developer for permission to use the 801 Tower in Batman
Forever in 1994.187 Although the parties did not discuss Zanja Madre specifically, “the parties
understood that Warner Bros. would film the property line along Figueroa.”188 In the end, “[t]he
801 Tower and the two lantern towers and two smoke towers in the [Figueroa] streetwall appear
briefly as background in a few scenes in the movie.”189 After Warner Bros. filmed these portions

water to Los Angeles in its early history. Also inside the perimeter of the courtyard are two sets of
two towers representing the city—two building towers and two towers with drill bits on top. The
fountain area and garden, which has benches for public use, represents a mountainous area around
Los Angeles that is a source of the city’s water.
Id. In addition to these historical elements, the work included five more towers and gates on the streetside wall of
the Zanja Madre courtyard adjacent to Figueroa Street:
Of the five towers comprising the streetwall, the two closest to the building (the “smoke towers”)
are topped by a brass metalwork design illustrating smoke flattening out under an inversion layer.
The two tallest towers (the “lantern towers”) have a lantern topped with grillwork. The lanterns are
at the same height and recall those affixed to the building; the tower bases likewise recall the
pilasters of the building. The lantern towers are lit at night (like the lanterns on the building). The
grillwork assembly consists of concentric rings that symbolize 1930s-era radio waves and modern
telecommunications signals. Between the two lantern towers is a fifth, shorter tower which is
capped by a vampire figure and to which the main gates are attached. When closed, the gates
represent a vampire bat derived from William Mulholland’s statement that Los Angeles is a “water
vampire.”
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 1215.
186
Id. at 1214. See supra note 183 for the court’s description of the gesamtwerk.
187
Id. at 1215.
188
Id.
189
Id. (“The balance of Zanja Madre—the vampire tower and the courtyard portion—do not appear in the
film.”).
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of Zanja Madre, Leicester registered it as a PGS work under § 102(5)(a) and sued Warner Bros.
for violation of his copyright.190
b. Batman undeterred: Affirming the district court in Leicester. The District Court for the
Central District of California rejected Leicester’s arguments in his claim that Warner Bros.
violated his copyright of Zanja Madre. Part of the district court’s approach consisted of using a
two-step incorporation or “integrated concept”191 test to determine whether an attached PGS
work should be considered part of the architectural work for purposes of the AWCPA. First, the
district court found that “the two lantern towers and the two smoke towers have functional
aspects designed to be part of the building plan and from their appearance are designed to match
up with the architecture of the building.”192 Then, the court found that “the artistic work at the
tops are incorporated into the tower structure and design, and are therefore an integrated part of
the ‘architectural work.’”193 Thus, because the artistic work was (1) a functional, and (2) an
integral part of the architectural work, the AWCPA protected it together with the architectural
work as an integrated whole, thus subjecting the attached PGS works to the pictorial
representation limitation of the AWCPA.194
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approach. The court found that
the 801 Tower’s streetwall was “plainly covered”195 by the AWCPA. That is, Leicester’s artistic
work at issue—the Figueroa streetwall and the lantern and smoke towers—was “part of the 801
Tower as a whole. . . . an integrated concept”196 because “[t]he streetwall was not a creative

190

Id.
Id. at 1217.
192
Id. at 1215.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 1218.
196
Id. at 1217.
191
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aspect of Leicester’s work; it was an architectural element mandated by the CRA.”197
Furthermore, “the streetwall matches the building and gives the impression that the building
continues to the end of the property line. The streetwall towers are designed to appear as part of
the building.”198 Thus, the court held that “because the streetwall towers are part of the
architectural work,”199 based on the district court’s “integrated concept”200 test for arriving at the
AWCPA’s bright-line copyright protection, they are covered together with the § 102(a)(8)
architectural works, subject to the pictorial representation limitation of § 120(a).201
Unfortunately, rather than more directly addressing the implications of the AWCPA
bright-line rule for the numerous conceptual separability tests, the court focused its attention on
the logic behind the § 120(a) exception. The court found that Leicester had no infringement
action for Warner Bros.’s pictorial representation of his artistic work since it was “part of the
design plan of the building”202 and that if Leicester could sue for infringement anyway, then “§
120(a)’s exemption for pictorial representations would make no sense.”203 In short, “it would be
counterintuitive to suppose that Congress meant to restrict pictorial copying to some, but not all
of, a unitary architectural work.”204 The court, however, affirmed the district court’s rejection of
Leicester’s arguments that the AWCPA did not change the protection an attached PGS work
could have acquired under the conceptual separability test(s) of the 1976 Copyright Act. In
disagreeing with Leicester that the district court had erred in any respect,205 the Ninth Circuit
thus affirmed the district court’s holding that
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Id. at 1218.
Id.
199
Id. at 1219.
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Id. at 1217.
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Id. at 1219.
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Id. at 1217.
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Id. at 1219.
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Id. at 1220.
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Id. at 1214.
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the intent of Congress [in passing the AWCPA] was to substitute the new
protection afforded architectural works [§ 102(a)(8) coupled with the § 120(a)
pictorial representation limitation] for the previous protection sometimes
provided under the conceptual separability test for non-utilitarian sculptures
(such as gargoyles and stained glass windows) incorporated into a work of
architecture.”206
In this way, then, the Leicester court shored up architectural works from falling into the
conceptual separability conundrum presented by the useful articles doctrine. But the court’s
defense of the AWCPA’s bright line was not as pronounced as it might have been, as Judge
Tashima pointed out in his concurring opinion.
c. No Riddle(r) about conceptual separability: the clarifying concurrence. The Leicester
concurrence throws the AWCPA’s bright-line rule into stark relief, pointedly discarding the
conceptual separability test for works of architecture or their attached PGS works. True, the
Leicester court showed admirable constraint in construing the AWCPA in accordance with its
congressional intent, rather than venturing into the equities for a judge-made solution.207 But
despite affirming the district court’s rejection of conceptual separability for architectural works,
the Leicester court nevertheless indulged in a tangential conceptual separability analysis, almost
as an afterthought. In a one-paragraph conceptual separability evaluation, the court found that
Leicester’s works were not conceptually separable precisely because “of the functional and
architectural vocabulary of the building,”208 an apparent reference to the district court’s
“integrated concept” test. Because of the confusion that this unnecessary tangent could engender,
the Leicester concurrence focused specifically on conceptual separability after the AWCPA.

206

Id. at 1215.
Compare supra Part II.C for an analysis of the proliferation of conceptual separability tests proceeding
from the bench pursuant to ambiguities in the statutory language of the Copyright Act of 1976 in adding PGS works
as a protected category.
208
Id. at 1219.
207
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In concurring in the decision, Judge Tashima clarified the position of the district court
and sided more closely with it than even the court had done. “I disagree only with [the court’s]
conclusion that the district court found that the streetwall towers were not ‘conceptually
separate’ from the building.”209 That is, Judge Tashima correctly noted that “the district court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the streetwall towers were conceptually separable
because it concluded as a matter of law that ‘the enactment of Section 120(a) had the effect of
limiting the conceptual separability concept to situations not involving architectural works.’”210
In a rigorous analysis of the AWCPA, its legislative history, and its internal logic, Judge
Tashima found that “the legislative history supports the position that functional PGS works
embedded in a building are no longer eligible for conceptual separability treatment.”211 In this
scrutiny of the AWCPA, Judge Tashima followed the court in noting the inconsistency of
conceptual separability and the pictorial representation limitation.212
Finally, Judge Tashima concluded his concurrence by highlighting the bright line in the
AWCPA much more clearly than the court had done. Specifically, under the AWCPA “all
protectable elements of an architectural work are protected exclusively under § 102(a)(8) so that
there is no need to determine whether any part of the work may be considered a conceptually
separable PGS work.”213 Even though “Congress was not as clear as it could have been in
enacting the AWCPA,”214 Judge Tashima reinforced the judicial role of “constru[ing] the Act so
as to effectuate congressional intent, as evidenced by the legislative history and common

209

Id. at 1220–21 (Tashima, J., concurring).
Id. at 1221.
211
Id. at 1222–23.
212
Id. at 1223 ([P]roviding full § 102(a)(5) protection to a PGS work embodied as a functional element in
an architectural work would eviscerate the pictorial representation exception because one could not photograph,
draw, paint, etc. (subject to the fair use doctrine) any building that had such a PGS work embodied in it.”).
213
Id. at 1224 (Tashima, J., concurring).
214
Id.
210
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sense.”215 Thus, Judge Tashima observed that under the AWCPA, “§ 102(a)(8) now provides the
sole source of copyright protection for functional PGS works embodied in an architectural
work.”216 This interpretation “gives meaning and substance to the pictorial representation
exemption Congress enacted in § 120(a).”217 Ironically, however, as the dissent pointed out,
ambiguity in both the statute and the legislative history opened the door for conceptual
separability to enter the architectural works context, the exact result that Congress meant to
avoid in the AWCPA.218
d. Dissenting discontent: A Two-face approach to architectural PGS works? In his
Leicester dissent, Judge Fisher stressed that an author of an attached PGS work should be able to
elect the preferred protection, either under § 102(a)(5) or § 102(a)(8). The result of this would
naturally be that “if the streetwall towers were conceptually separable from the 801 Tower, it
should receive protection as a sculptural work pursuant to Section 102(5) [sic] of the Copyright
Act”219 because § 102(a)(5) for PGS works is not subject to the pictorial representation limitation
as are architectural works. Judge Fisher based his views largely on a “cryptic and ambiguous”220
footnote in the legislative history’s discussion of election of remedies. First, Congress had
clarified that “[a]n individual creating an architectural work by depicting that work in plans or
drawing will have two separate copyrights, one in the architectural work . . . the other in the
plans or drawings . . . . Either or both of these copyrights may be infringed and eligible
separately for damages.”221 The legislative history appended this explanation with Footnote 41:

215

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
217
Id.
218
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951.
219
Alicia Morris Groos, Development in U.S. Copyright Law 2000-2001: From Revising the Old South to
Redefining the Digital Millennium, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 165 (2001).
220
Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1229 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
221
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950.
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[C]ertain works of authorship which may separately qualify for protection as
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works may be permanently embodied in
architectural works. Stained glass windows are one such example. Election is
inappropriate in any case where the copyright owner of a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work embodied in an architectural work is different from the copyright
owner of the architectural work.222
Judge Fisher understood this as possibly meaning that § 102(a)(5) would cover both copyright
holders in such a case, rendering election inappropriate.223 But Judge Tashima cogently
responded that “Congress meant that election is inappropriate because both copyright holders are
limited to § 102(a)(8) protection, given the inapplicability of the conceptual separability
doctrine.”224 Only this latter interpretation of Footnote 41 is consistent both with the pictorial
representation limitation, as Judge Tashima noted,225 and with the legislative history’s direct
expression of the desire to avoid conceptual separability in this context.226
2. Successful banishment of conceptual separability?
The district court in Leicester banished conceptual separability more clearly in
accordance with the legislative intent behind the AWCPA than did the Ninth Circuit on appeal.
When Leicester argued in the district court that the 1990 amendments were not meant to take
rights away from authors of attached PGS works who could obtain protection under the
Copyright Act of 1976 if their works were conceptually separable from an uncopyrightable
architectural work,227 the district court specifically found that “the intent of Congress was to
substitute the new protection afforded architectural works for the previous protection sometimes

222

H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 n.41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950.
Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1230 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
224
Id. at 1223 (Tashima, J., concurring).
225
Id.
226
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951 (expressing the desire to
spare judges the conceptual separability conundrum when adjudicating about the copyrightability of architectural
works).
227
Leicester v. Warner Bros., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501, 1508, 1998 WL 34016724 (C.D. Cal.).
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provided under the conceptual separability test.”228 It is true that the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court on this point.229 But in its otherwise conscientious decision, the Leicester court
dismissed Leicester’s argument that the artistic work was conceptually separable from the 801
Tower by carelessly engaging in a superficial conceptual separability analysis,230 rather than by
declaring that it did not matter whether it were conceptually separable or not under the new
bright-line rule. By resisting this temptation, the Leicester court could have closed the door more
cleanly on conceptual separability, which it had already done elsewhere in the decision.231
However, the Leicester concurrence directly addressed any lingering ambiguity left by the
court’s decision about whether the conceptual separability tests have any place under the
AWCPA: “all protectable elements of an architectural work [including attached PGS works] are
protected exclusively under § 102(a)(8),”232 which is subject to the pictorial representation
limitation.233 Thus, both the court and the concurrence in Leicester implemented the AWCPA’s
bright-line rule based on the statute and its legislative history.
B. Implications of the Bright-line Rule in the AWCPA
The AWCPA’s bright-line rule granting attached PGS works protection together with the
underlying architectural work affects architects, artists, and judges in different ways. Because
artists now share copyright protection for an “integrated concept”234 with the architect, artists
will need to approach such projects with an awareness of the higher bargaining power the
AWCPA gives them. Furthermore, this bright-line rule, as recognized and applied in Leicester,235
simplifies an absurdly complex matrix of conceptual separability tests for the benefit of judges,
228

Id.
Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1214.
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Id. at 1219 & n.3.
231
See, e.g., id. at 1214–15.
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Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1224 (Tashima, J., concurring).
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See supra text accompanying notes 207–218 for an analysis of the concurring opinion in Leicester.
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Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1217.
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See supra Part IV.A.
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who cannot avoid subjectivity in aesthetic determinations, their best efforts to the contrary
notwithstanding.236
1. More bargaining power for contracting artists of PGS works
Artists of attached PGS works now find themselves in a different position vis-à-vis
architects or developers than they were before 1990. In truth, these artists have lost a measure of
the separate protection they could have expected for their works that were conceptually separable
from utilitarian works of architecture.237 But this does not mean that they are in a worse position.
That is, as the Leicester concurrence noted, the “effect” of this limitation on the separate
protectability of an attached PGS work “can be minimized through contract” because “an artist
whose work will be incorporated into a building may demand more compensation to give up his
copyright or, alternatively, the architect and artist may register a single copyright as joint authors
of the entire work.”238 In other words, this new regime under the AWCPA puts artists into a
better bargaining position to protect themselves through thoughtful contracting from the outset.
Because they cannot protect their work separately from the architectural work after Leicester,
they now bring more clout to the bargaining table. This new approach at least boasts more
certainty of protection than did the old method of registering a work under the PGS provision of
§ 102(a)(5) and then, when trying to enforce that protection, hoping that a judge would be
aesthetically amenable to the idea that the work is indeed conceptually separable.
2. Saving the judges and avoiding aesthetic controversy
By sincerely searching out Congress’s intent in passing the AWCPA, which admittedly
could have been more clearly written, the Leicester court effectuated the reason behind
protecting architectural works and their attached PGS works together under the new § 102(a)(8).
236

See Yen, supra note 4, at 250.
See Orlandi, supra note 130, at 619.
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Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1224 n.4 (Tashima, J., concurring).
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As noted in the legislative history, “the principal reason for not treating architectural works as
[PGS] works” was “to avoid entangling architectural works in [the] disagreement”239 between
courts as to the application of conceptual separability. This desire may have been a recognition
of the fact that the maxim of equity lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittit240 is
inimical to the aesthetic objectivity required of judges in copyright adjudication.241 Or it may
have simply been a congressional desire to learn from the mistakes of the Copyright Act of 1976,
which created an inadequately defined separability test that necessarily gave rise to as many as
ten, possibly more, judge-made conceptual separability tests.242 Either way, after the AWCPA—
through the Leicester court’s lucid statutory construction based on the legislative intent—judges
are now “free to decide the issue [of protectability] upon the facts presented, free of the
separability conundrum presented by the useful articles doctrine applicable for PGS works”243
under the Copyright Act of 1976. Thus, the AWCPA’s bright-line rule saves judges from sinking
into the quagmire of conceptual separability and wallowing in the masked aesthetic subjectivity
that abounds there.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LANGUAGE OF THE LEGISLATION—“PERHAPS FAULTY, PERHAPS
GRATUITOUS”

Despite imperfections in the statutory language, the court in Leicester correctly
implemented Congress’s legislative intent in passing the AWCPA. By creating a bright-line rule,
Congress spared future judges considering the copyrightability of PGS works attached to
architectural works from choosing between numerous conceptual separability balancing tests and
239

H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951.
See supra note 2.
241
See supra text accompanying notes 18–37 for a discussion of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co.,
188 U.S. 239 (1903) and Justice Holmes’s demand for aesthetic objectivity—still adhered to at least in form more
than 100 years later—in copyright adjudication.
242
See supra Part II.C.
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H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6952.
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the resulting aesthetic judgments that contradict essential policy behind copyright law in their
determinations. The impossibility of true objectivity in matters of aesthetic judgment
necessitated Congress’s action in formulating a bright-line rule for application in these types of
cases. In this way, Congress eliminated the risk that judges would provide de facto governmental
subsidies for certain attached PGS works while denying them to others merely on the basis of
subjective taste.
Language in the statute regarding the pictorial representation exception and the
misinterpreted dual coverage for attached PGS may indeed have been “perhaps faulty, perhaps
gratuitous,”244 but if so, then Congress itself is more institutionally suited to make appropriate
changes. Courts should not attempt to amend an ambiguous statute through adjudication,
particularly in an area as value-sensitive as copyright law.245 In copyright law, where judges
“must realize that their personal perspectives and experiences are deeply implicated in their
adjudication,”246 judges should give strict effect to the legislative intent behind a statute such as
the AWCPA when ambiguity exists in “faulty” or “gratuitous” statutory language. By giving the
congressional intent behind the AWCPA’s bright-line rule the effect of stare decisis, the
Leicester court admirably fulfilled this strict role.
John B. Fowles
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Mathis, supra note 28, at 598.
Compare Orlandi, supra note 130, at 644–52 (disregarding the legislative intent behind the AWCPA in
suggesting a six-factor test to fix apparent inequities in the AWCPA’s bright-line rule).
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Yen, supra note 4, at 251 n.15.
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